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ABSTRACT
Does recent growth of darknet markets signify a slow reorganisa-
tion of the illicit drug trade? Where are darknet markets situated
in the global drug supply chain? In principle, these platforms allow
producers to sell directly to end users, bypassing traditional traffick-
ing routes. And yet, there is evidence that many offerings originate
from a small number of highly active consumer countries, rather
than from countries that are primarily known for drug production.
In a large-scale empirical study, we determine the darknet trading
geography of three plant-based drugs across four of the largest
darknet markets, and compare it to the global footprint of produc-
tion and consumption for these drugs. We present strong evidence
that cannabis and cocaine vendors are primarily located in a small
number of consumer countries, rather than producer countries,
suggesting that darknet trading happens at the ‘last mile’, possibly
leaving old trafficking routes intact. A model to explain trading
volumes of opiates is inconclusive. We cannot find evidence for
significant production-side offerings across any of the drug types
or marketplaces. Our evidence further suggests that the geography
of darknet market trades is primarily driven by existing consumer
demand, rather than new demand fostered by individual markets.
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1 INTRODUCTION
The global illicit drug trade is estimated to beworth USD $321Bn [26].
Traditionally, drugs have travelled along long and complicated sup-
ply chains [16]. However, the emergence of new trading platforms
has the potential to change these relationships. Darknet markets,
also called cryptomarkets, rely on anonymising technology and
electronic currencies to facilitate licit and illicit transactions among
participants in relative anonymity [4, 9, 19, 36]. Recent studies sug-
gest that they operate at a comparatively small scale relative to the
global drug economy, however there are numerous indications of
rapid growth [1, 3, 20, 30, 35]. Similar to their legal equivalents,
these illicit markets allow the simultaneous presence of multiple
types of actors on the same platform [16, 23]. They act as brokers
in a multi-sided network between large numbers of supply- and
demand-side participants, providing a shared interface for varied
interactions that formerly took place on open markets [21]. In prin-
ciple this introduces opportunities to replace old intermediaries
with new entrants, potentially reconfiguring the physical supply
chains underlying these markets in the process [15]. While such
effects have been documented for commercial platforms [15, 21],
relatively little is known about their impact on the illicit trade.
In response to such shifts, there is great interest among re-
searchers and policy makers to better understand the emergent
phenomenon of darknet markets, including some central aspects
of their economic geography. However, current understanding of
these platforms is still limited. In particular, there is little published
knowledge about their link to public health and public policy. What
is the relationship between darknet trades and the global distri-
bution and consumption of illicit drugs? More specifically, what
is their place in the global drug supply chain? Answers to these
questions help reveal the ways in which a layer of the internet
specifically designed to conceal geography might in turn alter ma-
terial economic geographies. A secondary research interest relates
to the use of darknet market data as as an indicator measure in
predictive models of broader societal phenomena. In principle, their
trading activity provides an evidence base for drug distribution and
consumption behaviours that would otherwise be hard to study at
large scale. However, before such use it is first necessary to improve
our understanding of the nature and limitations of this evidence,
and of its fitness for purpose. Is there spatial bias inherent in the
data? Does this data allow us to draw inferences about the broader
drug supply chain, or only certain specific aspects?
Principles from economic geography allow us to study these
aspects in a rigorous and empirical manner. Most importantly, the
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framework of global production networks (GPN) can be used to
understand how global supply chains are formed.1 Central to the
theory is the observation that such relationships are inherently spa-
tial: there is a geography of production, distribution, and consump-
tion [17]. For certain goods, it is possible to identify distinct spatial
profiles for different parts of the supply chain. In the context of
illicit drugs, such spatial profiling is possible for plant-based drugs
such as cannabis, cocaine, and opiates [28]. Their site of production
can be determined with some precision based on biomarkers, as
well as arrest records after large seizures, which makes it possible
to distinguish supply and demand geographies in some detail. It is
harder to establish similar spatial profiles for synthetic drugs.
Based on these foundations, we present the first study to address
the economic geography of darknet markets in a comprehensive
empirical manner, with a focus on the supply chain underlying
these markets. Our study relates regional darknet trading activity
with the supply- and demand-side geographies of the three widely
traded plant-based drug types cannabis, cocaine, and opiates. Our
study seeks to address two primary questions:
(1) Is the geography of darknet trading sited closer to the supply-
or demand-sides of illegal drug production networks? In
other words, are darknet markets directly connecting pro-
ducers to consumers, or are they simply new kinds of inter-
mediaries, leaving existing supply chains in place?
(2) Do these relationships vary across markets? In other words,
do some darknet markets specialise on particular segments
of the supply chain?
We find that darknet markets are strongly characterised by a ‘last-
mile’ geography that is focused on a small number of highly active
consumer countries, rather than presenting as global platforms that
disintermediate existing global production networks. This finding is
highly consistent across market platforms. Study outcomes further
suggest that darknet trading is largely shaped by global demand,
rather than fostering new demand. As a result, it is likely that the
economic incentives offered by this external demand yield a high
ecological robustness against interventions.
This study makes two further contributions to the literature. A
first contribution is conceptual: we introduce concepts from eco-
nomic geography to frame our inquiry, situate darknet markets
in existing platform discourse, and draw on criminology to char-
acterise the nature of illicit supply chains. This grounding of our
analysis in existing theory allows us to locate darknet markets in
the global illicit supply chain. In a second empirical contribution,
we systematically collect a large volume of evidence across four
large markets, comprising of 1.5M trades, which represents 80% of
the global inventory at the time of study. Our findings are consis-
tent with a large number of prior studies, and our evidence base
allows us to develop further understanding. Based on these factors,
we propose that our observations have high external validity.
2 RELATEDWORK
According to political economist Nick Srnicek, platforms are “a
newly predominant type of business model premised upon bring-
ing different groups together” [32]. Typical examples of platform
1While we are primarily drawing on the GPN literature, we use the terms global
production network and supply chain interchangeably in this paper.
businesses include Amazon, Google, Uber, and others. These busi-
nesses act as brokers in a multi-sided network between supply-
and demand-side participants, providing a shared interface for in-
teractions that formerly took place on open markets. Successful
platforms derive competitive advantage from network effects, ag-
gregating large numbers of participants [21]. Their centralising
power can allow the largest platforms to achieve a quasi-monopoly
position [31]. Their business models typically involve rent-seeking
in the form of transaction fees, and other forms of profit derived
from the hosted transactions and resulting data trails [21].
The economic power of this arrangement is not constrained to
purely legitimate forms of trade. Past research has already docu-
mented the platform and service infrastructure of the global spam
value chain [22]. More recently, darknet markets have emerged as
a new kind of platform for trades of illicit goods and services. A
growing body of research is documenting their activities, however
there is still little understanding of their platformed nature. Where
are they situated in the global illicit supply chain? To address this
question, we will first review existing characterisations of dark-
net markets. We then review characterisations of the illicit supply
chains supporting the online drug trade. Finally, we relate these two
aspects, with a specific focus on the economic geography of illicit
trades. We conclude our review with a summary of open issues.
2.1 Characterisations of Darknet Markets
Silk Road, the first prominent darknet market, introduced many key
practices that are still used by today’s darknet markets. Known as
an ‘eBay for drugs’ and modelled on e-commerce platforms, it relied
on anonymising technology and electronic currencies to facilitate
transactions in relative anonymity [4, 9, 19, 36]. Ideologically, it
was shaped by market-libertarian underpinnings: the stated aim of
its founder was to create an open marketplace for any conceivable
form of trade, seemingly out of reach of the state [39].
Law enforcement has since managed to shut down Silk Road, but
dozens of successor platforms have achieved similar prominence
since then, and the overall ecosystem appears to be resilient to
law enforcement take-downs: new platforms appear as old ones
close, driven by steady customer demand [30, 33]. Markets offer
an ever-increasing repertoire of illicit goods and services, with a
prominent focus on recreational drugs such as cocaine, cannabis,
and psychedelics, but also opiates such as heroin, various forms of
novel psychoactive substances, and digital information goods such
as stolen credit cards and other accounts [3, 8, 12, 30, 34].
Almost paradoxically, darknet markets are often relatively easily
accessed by anyone with a Tor browser, informed by an aspiration
to increase adoption [39]. Their high volatility makes it difficult
to reliably track the overall ecosystem over time, however there
are numerous indications of significant growth [1, 3, 20, 30, 35].
Yet compared to the overall drug trade, trading volumes are still
negligible. According to a 2015 estimate, the total turnover across
darknet markets was in the order of USD $150-180M/year [30]. By
comparison, a 2005 report by the UN Office on Drug and Crime
(UNODC) estimates the retail value of the global illicit drug trade
at USD $321Bn [26].
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Motivations to participate in darknet trading are varied. Typical
participants are young and male [5–7, 35, 36]. While many first-
time users are simply driven by curiosity or technical interest [36],
a large share of participants has the intention to engage in regular
trade, sometimes with the intention to resell [4, 7, 37]. Buyers
report ‘window-shopping’ behaviour, where they join a market
with a particular purchasing decision, but then begin ordering other
goods that are also on offer [7], illustrating the platformed nature.
Similar to offline crime, participation in darknet markets incurs
various forms of risk, including detection by law enforcement, loss
of shipments, vendor fraud, and others [24]. The perceived benefits
include a reduction of physical danger compared to street trades,
increased product quality at cheaper prices, speedy delivery, and
the convenience of varied and well-presented offerings from the
same source [6, 7, 36, 37].
2.2 Illicit Supply Chains
Conventional drug distribution networks often rely on hierarchical
management structures to coordinate their trade [18]. At the same
time, recent research in crime science has portrayed such organ-
ised drug trafficking as mostly the work of small groups of loosely
linked entrepreneurs, rather than large and deeply structured crim-
inal syndicates [25, 38]. In principle, such loose arrangements are
amenable to large-scale reorganisation. Novel technologies such
as anonymising software, cryptocurrencies, and other innovations
can act as potential enablers for such a reorganisation [1, 4, 16]. Do
they already have an apparent effect on the structure of the global
drug production network?
There are indicators that darknet market distribution networks
are starting to differ from the classic cartel distribution channels
of the 20th century, where there was a linear flow from growers,
wholesale aggregators and processors, international transporters,
intermediate distributors, and retail or hand-to-hand sellers [16].
Instead, darknet markets allow the simultaneous presence of multi-
ple types of actors on the same platforms [23]. In a review of opioid
supply chains, three case studies illustrate how products can be
bought, repackaged, and resold on the same platform [16].
Yet, relatively little is known about the actual distribution net-
works behind darknet market offerings. Early studies appear to
confirm the varied and dispersed nature of organisational models.
A study of an online opioid market finds that participant interac-
tions are structured as a small-world network, rather than the more
linear model of a traditional supply chain [13]. These networked
relations were found to be shaped by preferential attachment, and
a need to develop trusted relationships among anonymous partic-
ipants. Such structures allow for a diffusion of commerce that is
more amendable to new entrants, including bulk traders, potentially
supporting subsequent redistribution elsewhere [2].
2.3 Economic Geography of Darknet Markets
The supply chains behind darknet trades can be described in terms
of their economic geography. To manage risk during shipping, dark-
net market vendors can state their own location and acceptable
delivery destinations in product listings, at country resolution. In a
validation study, test orders could confirm that these self-reported
vendor locations are reliable as geographic indicators [29]. As a
consequence, the information architecture of darknet markets can
allow researchers to broadly assess the trading geography of market
offerings. It is commonly found that there is high spatial concentra-
tion: a small number of the same countries are responsible for the
majority of global trades, regardless of the marketplace. Top trading
countries include the US, the U.K., Australia, Germany, Holland,
Canada, and China [2, 5, 8, 9, 12, 34].
In an early exploratory spatial data analysis [12], a study across
four drug types attempts to relate darknetmarket listings on a single
market to the known geography of the sites of production for these
drugs. The geographic distributions are assessed visually and by
identifying extreme outliers, and then manually compared with
documented production geographies. Based on this comparison,
the authors posit that the darknet trade of heroin and cocaine
has a strong retail focus, in that most offerings were not sold from
known producer countries. On the other hand, themarkets for novel
psychoactive substances and prescription drugs are more mixed,
with a share of the offerings coming from producer regions [12].
A first study to assess the trading flows between vendor locations
and potential destination countries finds some regional difference in
trading geography, based on the listings of a single large market [8].
Australian vendors primarily serve local customers, while vendors
in other countries such as Holland, Germany, and China offer to
trade internationally. It is further found that some countries are
more specialised in their inventories than others. For example,
offerings from Holland are comparatively more focused on ecstasy
and stimulants, while those in other top trading countries are more
diversified. In comparison to physical goods, listings for digital
products are less likely to state a vendor location.
2.4 Knowledge Gaps
In principle, the presence of basic geographic indicators in dark-
net offerings allows to develop a more detailed understanding of
the global production networks behind these trades. Yet to date,
the literature offers no comprehensive empirical assessment of the
spatial relationships between production, trade, and consumption
of particular drug types on darknet markets. Research in crime
science suggests that producers may also become participants on
such markets, potentially removing previous trafficking structures.
On the other hand, early studies suggest that a high spatial concen-
tration of trades is largely shaped by the consumption geography
of the traded goods, rather than the production geography. There
presently is no analysis of how such relationships may vary across
market platforms. How closely connected are production regions
to these new online distribution channels? To what extent have old
supply chains been fully replaced by darknet markets?
3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS
We seek to develop a more detailed understanding of the global
production networks behind darknet market trades. In the present
study, we focus on the spatial relationships between production,
trade, and consumptions in the drug supply chain.
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Q1: Is the geography of darknet trading sited
closer to the supply- or demand-sides of illegal
drug production networks?
How well does the geography of darknet market vendor locations
match the documented distribution of global production sites, or
of global consumption? For certain drug types, comparing these
geographies allows us to draw inferences about the underlying
supply chain, from production, to trade, to consumption. Does
increased local production of certain drugs lead to an increase in
trade? Conversely, is trade demand-driven, and largely shaped by
drug consumption in the local population?
Based on prior observations in the literature, we expect to find no
significant link between production geography and trading volumes.
Instead, we expect to find that market supply is largely demand-
driven. This finding would suggest that darknet markets have not
necessarily replaced prior supply chains, and are instead primarily
novel forms of local distribution serving the ‘last mile’.
Q2: Do these relationships vary across markets?
It is feasible that there are ‘wholesale’ marketplaces where produc-
ers predominantly serve distributors, and ‘retail’ markets where
distributors serve end users. For certain drug categories we expect
to see this reflected in their trading geography, which may more
closely reflect the geography of drug producers, or that of drug con-
sumers. Can we identify such market specialisation, based on the
geographic distribution of offerings? Or are the spatial relationships
relatively constant across markets?
Although somemarkets may serve slightly different geographies,
based on prior work it is likely that the global distribution pattern
is largely comparable across markets. We expect to find a simi-
lar trading geography across most markets, situated closer to the
consumption-side than the production-side.
4 METHODS
For the purpose of this study, we define darknet markets as two-
sided markets that operate as Tor hidden service, connecting large
numbers of vendors to large numbers of buyers, offering a wide
range of licit and illicit products that are catalogued in a structured
manner comparable to e-commerce platforms. We exclude single-
vendor sites, and specialty markets for single product categories
such as stolen credit cards, software exploits, and others.
We rely on two primary sources of evidence. First, we compre-
hensively survey the darknet market ecosystem in May 2017, and
identify the largest platforms by inventory. Based on this survey,
we select four large markets which represent approximately 80% of
the global inventory, and capture their full trading histories. This
data represents a significant historic archive of illicit transactions,
comprising approximately 1.5M trades. Second, using data by the
UNODC we determine the geography of supply and demand for
three plant-based drug types: cannabis, cocaine, and opiates. Using
these two data sets, we produce a comprehensive statistical model
of the economic geography of darknet market trades, incorporating
trading activity across more than 50 countries. For each drug type,
we build a regression model to explain the geography of its trade
based on its production and consumption geography.
Market Vendors Items Trades6
Alphabay 7,500 140,300 1,308,500
Hansa 2,300 51,800 91,900
Traderoute 600 9,200 3,300
Valhalla 1,100 30,400 9,100
Total 231,700 1,412,800
Table 1: Catalogue sizes of the four platforms included in
the study, rounded to hundreds. Data from June/July 2017.
4.1 Scraping the Largest Markets
We began with an initial survey of the ecosystem, using link lists
published on the English-speaking internet in May 2017.2,3,4,5 We
identified 36 uniquemarkets that fit our criteria. Of these, we further
excluded platforms that had gone offline, forum-based platforms
which do not provide structured catalogue listings, and platforms
that required an invite. Of the remainder, 21 platforms provided
inventory counters in their navigation structure, which allowed us
to estimate the total size of their trading inventory. Special care
was taken to include the most prominent sites that were featured
across multiple link lists.
Our survey revealed high centralisation: the largestmarket claimed
to offer 60% of the global inventory, and the largest 5 were respon-
sible for almost 95%. We selected four of the largest markets for
inclusion in our study, covering 80% of global listings: Alphabay,
Hansa, Traderoute, and Valhalla. A fifth market (at 14%) was not in-
cluded, as its information architecture did not allow us to determine
trading estimates on a per-product basis (see next paragraph).
For each of the four markets, we scraped a single snapshot of the
full catalogue in late June to early July 2017. We pursued a variety of
strategies to discover product pages: while the sequential identifiers
used by three markets allowed us to discover hidden listings, a
fourth market required a crawl of catalogue listings to gradually
discover all listed products. To ensure completeness we observed
platform downtimes, session expiry, and other intermittent failure
modes, and retried requests when necessary.
We estimated trading volumes based on buyer reviews for listed
products, informed by prior work published in the literature [9, 30].
We estimate one trade for every review posted on a market. Since
buyer reviews are not mandatory on all markets, the resulting
estimates serve as a lower bound of actual trades. This approach
allowed us to establish significant trading histories: Alphabay and
Traderoute displayed a full history of all reviews, Hansa displayed
the last six months of reviews, and Valhalla the last three months.
In total, the collected data accounts for almost 1.5M trades. The
resulting summary statistics of market catalogues and trading esti-
mates are shown in Table 1. Vendors provided a country of origin
for approximately 80% of the listings, which allowed us to establish
a detailed trading geography. The top countries in number of trades
are the USA (27%), Great Britain (22%), Germany (8%), Australia
2https://dnstats.net/
3http://grams7enufi7jmdl.onion/markets
4https://www.reddit.com/r/DNMSuperlist/wiki/superlist
5https://www.deepdotweb.com/2013/10/28/updated-llist-of-hidden-marketplaces-tor-i2p/
6Estimated from buyer reviews, refer to Section 4.1 for details.
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(8%), and Holland (7%), together these ‘top five’ account for more
than 70% of the global trade. The remaining 10% are distributed
across 114 countries. This distribution suggests a highly unequal
trading geography: by comparison, in 2015 the same five countries
only represented 7% of the global population [11].
To prepare the data for analysis, we normalised the stated geo-
graphic location of vendors by mapping them to ISO 3166 country
codes. We further identified all cannabis, cocaine and opiate prod-
ucts across markets based on product titles and market-specific
product categories. Products categorised under terms such as ‘buds’,
‘weed’, ‘hash’, ‘cannabis’, ‘cannabis concentrates’, or similar were la-
belled asCannabis . Products whose categorisation or title contained
‘cocaine’ were labelled Cocaine . Opiates were identified by men-
tions of ‘heroin’, ‘morphine’, or ‘opium’, and were labelled Opiates .
In all cases, we excluded synthetic variants and prescription drug
preparations such as fentanyl, hydrocodone, and oxycodone, as
well as listings of test kits for these drugs.
4.2 Production and Consumption Geography
The annual UNODCWorld Drug Report collects detailed data about
the global geography of production, trafficking, and consumption
of several widely traded drug types. This includes country-level
statistics that we can use as basis for our analysis. [28] We extract
two sets of data from this report.
First, the consumption geography of different drugs is described
by a report on drug use. This is a national estimate of the percentage
of adults who have consumed a particular drug category in the
preceding year, grouped into major drug categories. Methodologies
for data collection vary by country and sample, but typically these
are based on surveys among adult participants of age 15 and older.
In cases where multiple survey results were available for a country
and drug type, we selected the most recent result. Most of the
information is sufficiently recent: 82% of the selected records were
from the last 10 years (2007-2016), and only 24% from 2001-2005.
Inspection of the data showed that these older reports contained
countries from all major continents, and we do not expect that their
inclusion introduces a systematic geographic bias.
Second, we derive information about the geography of drug
production from a dataset of 490,000 significant drug seizures, avail-
able for the years 2010-2015. This data set records the presumed
production country of each seized good, as stated in arrest reports.
Unfortunately, seized drug volumes are reported in a variety of
units that cannot be map to a single unit of measurement, including
weights, volumes, tablet counts, and ampoules. Instead, we deter-
mine the number of seizures per country as a baseline estimate of
local drug production activity. Some manual labelling was required
to accommodate our analysis, as drug names in this data are not
standardised and categorised to the same degree. Non-synthetic opi-
ates that may have been preprocessed, but are not yet in medicine
form were labelled as Opiates . Cocaine in raw and processed form
but not yet inmedicine formwas labelledCocaine . All organic forms
of cannabis were labelled Cannabis , excluding synthetic variants.
For every drug type, we computed the overall number of seizures
that occurred, aggregated by the presumed country of production.
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Figure 1: Feature distribution per drug type. Visualised as
ranked country measurements, using a logarithmic scale.
For both data sets we normalised country designations, mapping
them to ISO 3166 country codes when there was a single and un-
ambiguous mapping. Data for the U.K. presented a special case, as
it was reported separately for England and Wales, Scotland, and
Northern Ireland. For population prevalence data, we computed a
weighted average for UK based on recent population sizes [14]. For
seizures, we aggregated the national counts.
The data comes with some limitations. These relatively com-
prehensive data sets depend on national reports, which are not
available for all countries. Information about drug production is
derived from arrest records and seizures, which are not collected
for all countries. The U.K. and Canada only make information about
seizures available for some drug types, and for Australia this data is
not available at all. While Mexico is reportedly one of the world’s
largest cocaine producers, it does not feature in the global cocaine
seizures data. Additionally, the seizures data is likely skewed by
differences in local law enforcement practices. Despite these limita-
tions, this is likely the most detailed source of information available
on the global drug economy [27].
4.3 Feature Vectors
From these data sets we compute a feature vector per drug type,
each containing country-specific measurements for three variables:
• Seizures : the number of significant seizures of a drug where
the country is the presumed site of production.7
• Trades : the number of trades on darknet markets by vendor
location, as estimated by the number of buyer reviews.
• UseInPop: the share of the population that has consumed
the drug in the last year.
For each feature vector, we only included countries for which all
three variables can be determined. We regard darknet market data
as a comprehensive survey of the global ecosystem, and countries
that did not feature in trades are treated as having 0 sales. On
the other hand, data about national production and consumption
are regarded as samples, and countries that are not included in
7While local enforcement practices can vary widely, this measure can serve as a
baseline estimate of local drug production. Refer to Section 4.2 for details.
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Figure 2: Global distribution of cannabis production, trade,
and consumption9.
UNODC reports are treated as unknown measurements, and cannot
be included in our analysis. Such exclusions are acceptable as long as
a sufficiently large number of major trading countries is represented
in the data. After exclusion, the feature vector for cannabis includes
complete measurements for 60 countries, for cocaine 52 countries
(both include US, GB, DE, and NL but exclude AU), and for opiates
47 (with US, DE, and NL, but excluding GB and AU.) The data is
available for download8.
The variable distribution across the three feature vectors is
shown in Figure 1. As none of the measures is normally distributed,
we derived standardised and log-transformed variants for all feature
vectors. In our analysis we will primarily report model outcomes
for the normalised measures, but we always also compute outcomes
8https://dx.doi.org/10.5287/bodleian:E9jknXek6
9Production is measured as the number of seizures of significant drug shipments,
and attributed to the country of production. Trade is measured as the number of drug
sales on darknet markets, as estimated from buyer reviews. Consumption is measured
as the percentage of a population who report drug use in the last year.
Figure 3: Global distribution of cocaine production, trade,
and consumption.
for the standardised and log-transformed feature vectors to confirm
the result, and we will state when these differ.
According to these measures, consumption and production geog-
raphy are correlated for cocaine (Spearman correlation coefficient
ρS = 0.29, p < 0.05). This is supported visually by the maps in
Figure 3, which show that several South American countries are
both producers and consumers of this drug. For cannabis and opi-
ates, there is no significant relationship between the geographies
of production and consumption, suggesting they are largely inde-
pendent. This is confirmed by the maps in Figure 2 and Figure 4.
We observe low condition indices for all feature vectors (cannabis:
1.2, cocaine: 1.3, opiates: 1.9), which shows low multicollinearity
across the features. This also suggests that the correlated inputs for
the cocaine feature vector are unlikely to bias regression outcomes.
In addition to these global feature vectors, we produced four
market-specific variants that cover the same countries. We nor-
malised the variables in each feature vector to address their dif-
ferences in measurement ranges. This allows us to compare the
6
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Figure 4: Global distribution of opiate production, trade, and
consumption.
proportional relationships of a consumption-side and production-
side geography between drug types and markets, regardless of their
respective trading volumes.
4.4 Analysis
To address Q1, we first visually related feature variable distributions
by means of a parallel coordinates plot. We then compared the data
statistically by means of a pairwise correlation analysis, then with
an OLS linear regression model to explain the distribution ofTrades
using Seizures and UseInPop. For the market comparison in Q2,
we further compute individual regression models per market. All
outcomes of these analyses are reported in the following sections.
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Figure 5: Parallel coordinates plot: national prevalence of
cannabis, across normalised measures of production, trade,
and consumption, on a logarithmic scale. Darker shades in-
dicate countries with higher trading volumes. The plot illus-
trates that for the top trading countries, national consump-
tion of the drug is high, while national production is low.
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Figure 6: National prevalence of cocaine. For the top trading
countries, there is a clear relationship between trade and na-
tional consumption, but not national production.
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Figure 7: National prevalence of opiates. For this drug type
the relationships are less clear: darknet trade is largely inde-
pendent of both national production and consumption.
7
WWW 2018, April 23–27, 2018, Lyon, France M. Dittus et al.
Aspect Variable Cannabis Cocaine Opiates
Production Seizures (-0.08) (-0.11) (0.02)
Consumption UseInPop 0.38 0.48 (-0.08)
Intercept (-0.05) (-0.07) (0.06)
Table 2: Regression coefficients for three drug models to ex-
plain national trading volumes (Trades) based on national
production (Seizures) and consumption (UseInPop) of each
drug. Coefficients in bold are significantwithp < 0.001, those
in brackets are not significant.
5 RESULTS
5.1 Q1: Overall Trading Geography
The feature vectors for each drug type are visualised as parallel
coordinate plots in Figures 5-7. In these plots, the three feature vari-
ables are represented using three vertical axes, ranging from 0-100%
on a logarithmic axis, and placed alongside each other for visual
comparison. Each country is represented as a line drawn across the
three axes, so that the line’s anchor point on each axis corresponds
to the country’s measurement for the respective variable.
The plot for cannabis in Figure 5 suggests a relationship between
local darknet trade and drug consumption, but not local production
of the drug. It further illustrates that this relationship holds not
just for the top trading countries, but also for countries with lower
trading volumes. The plot for cocaine in Figure 6 suggests a similar
spatial relationship. On the other hand, the spatial relationships
for opiates are less clear: as Figure 7 shows, there is no strong
relationship between local production and local trade, or local con-
sumption and trade. The map in Figure 4 illustrates this relationship
further. While peak opiate consumption primarily happens in the
Middle East, Russia, and Asia, darknet trading volumes of opiates
are highest in the same countries as the other two drugs.
These pairwise relationships are confirmed with a correlation
analysis. For cannabis, there is significant correlation between na-
tional trade and consumption (ρS = 0.66, p < 0.001), but not trade
and production. For cocaine, national trade and consumption are
correlated (ρS = 0.36, p < 0.01), but not trade and production.
For opiates, neither variable pairs are correlated. An OLS linear
model confirms these relationships. Table 2 reports the regression
coefficients for the cannabis model (adjusted R2 = 0.19) and for
cocaine (adjusted R2 = 0.33). Both report a significant relationship
between local trade and consumption, but not production. A model
for opiates was not significant for any of the covariates. These rela-
tionships hold for the standardised and log-transformed variants
of the three feature vectors.
5.2 Q2: Market-Specific Trading Geography
We first assessed the trading geography for every market by means
of a pairwise correlation analysis between drug trade and produc-
tion, and trade and consumption. The results are shown in Table 3,
they each reflect the same spatial relationships as encountered for
the overall trade. Results for the corresponding market-specific
regression models are reported in Table 4, all models are highly
consistent with the global model. In other words, for cocaine and
cannabis, all four markets appear to be located in demand-side
Market Variable Cannabis Cocaine Opiates
Alphabay Seizures (-0.08) (0.11) (-0.09)
UseInPop 0.67 0.35 (-0.11)
Hansa Seizures (-0.04) (0.08) (-0.04)
UseInPop 0.56 0.41 (-0.03)
Traderoute Seizures (0.02) (0.06) (0.20)
UseInPop 0.47 0.37 (-0.04)
Valhalla Seizures (0.01) (0.03) (0.01)
UseInPop 0.56 0.34 (-0.06)
Table 3: Pairwise Spearman correlation coefficients between
Trades and Seizures or UseInPop across the four markets,
demonstrating that the spatial relationships are broadly
consistent across markets. Coefficients in bold are signifi-
cant with p < 0.001, those in brackets are not significant, all
others are significant with p < 0.02.
Market Variable Cannabis Cocaine Opiates
Alphabay Seizures (-0.08) (-0.11) (0.02)
UseInPop 0.38 0.48 (-0.08)
Intercept (-0.05) (-0.07) (0.06)
Hansa Seizures (-0.05) (-0.12) (-0.01)
UseInPop 0.31 0.43 (-0.05)
Intercept (-0.06) (-0.06) (0.06)
Traderoute Seizures (-0.11) (-0.07) (-0.04)
UseInPop 0.44 0.32 (0.01)
Intercept (-0.04) (-0.05) (0.03)
Valhalla Seizures (-0.08) (-0.08) (0.03)
UseInPop 0.34 0.27 (-0.08)
Intercept (-0.03) (-0.03) (0.05)
Table 4: Individual regression models for the four markets.
Coefficients in bold are significant with p < 0.001, those in
brackets are not significant, all others are significant with
p < 0.02.
geographies, but not supply-side geographies. As before, the com-
parison for opiates was inconclusive.
6 DISCUSSION
Our analysis is based on a systematically collected and large cor-
pus, containing a full trading history of the four largest markets in
mid-2017, comprising 1.5M estimated trades. According to an initial
survey, this represents 80% of the global darknet market inventory.
We assessed spatial patterns visually, and confirmed our observa-
tions using rigorous statistical methods. This choice of methods
allows us to interpret the contextual nature of our findings in some
detail. We will first summarise and contextualise the key findings,
and then discuss their implications.
First, we confirm that trading is strongly focused on a small num-
ber of highly-active countries. 70% of global trades are attributable
to the ‘top five’ of USA, U.K., Australia, Germany, and Holland.
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(A further 20% are not associated with any country of origin.) In
comparison, the same countries only represent 7% of the global
population. This strong spatial concentration has previously been
observed by others [2, 5, 8, 9, 12, 34], and is illustrated here with
some further clarity in the form of detailed maps and diagrams.
Second, we find a clear and simple relationship: trade of cocaine
and cannabis on darknet markets is highest in peak consumer coun-
tries for these drugs, rather than peak producer countries. While
it remains possible that some producers of such drugs also sell
directly on darknet markets, the vast share of darknet offerings are
provided by redistributors who are in closer proximity to end users.
Third, this relationship cannot be confirmed for opiates. For this
drug type, trade is distributed differently than both production and
consumption. The maps in Figure 4 and parallel coordinates plot in
Figure 7 illustrate this: while opiate consumption is highest in the
Middle East, Russia, and Asia, opiate trading volumes are highest
in the ‘top five’ countries. This suggests that more complex models
are needed to explain the trading geography of these drugs. We
make some suggestions for future work in Section 7.1.
Fourth, neither of the drug types is shipped from peak producer
locations to a significant degree, including opiates. This further
emphasises that market activity is firmly taking place in consumer
regions: the trading is local or regional, rather than global.
We posit that these findings have high external validity: our
models for cocaine and cannabis are consistent for four major
markets across more than 50 countries, and our observations of
the geographic distribution of trades are consistent with previously
published findings for other marketplaces.
6.1 Implications
The spatial pattern observed here confirms that for the small num-
ber of highly active countries, darknet market trading is focused
on the ‘last mile’: vendors are situated closer to places of consump-
tion than places of production. This makes it unlikely that darknet
markets are removing or replacing prior supply chains. Rather,
they appear to reconfigure the last mile of the supply chain for
certain consumer countries, leaving existing trafficking routes from
production sites largely untouched. Darknet vendors likely still
rely on some of the same producers and traffickers involved in the
conventional drug trade. In other words, darknet markets are not
disintermediators with global reach, but rather provide a novel form
of retail distribution for certain consumer countries, potentially
offering new forms of risk reduction for buyers and sellers.
Our findings further suggest that platform adoption is largely
shaped by extrinsic factors, rather than platform-specific aspects.
The four markets show similar spatial arrangements, which sug-
gests they inhabit similar roles in the supply chain: neither of these
markets is situated more closely to producers, instead all are firmly
situated on the demand side. Overall, this also suggests that their
adoption is largely driven by existing external demand, rather than
new demand brought about by these new markets. This finding is
not surprising, given that darknet markets only represent a small
fraction of the global drug trade. As a consequence, it is unlikely
that current darknet markets significantly alter the global drug
production network. Similarly, market closures by law enforcement
are unlikely to effect changes to the public consumption of illicit
drugs, instead new markets will likely emerge to fulfil the existing
large demand. Recent research has already documented such an
ecological robustness among darknet markets [10, 13, 20].
Our findings have further implications for the use of darknet
market data as indicator measures. Researchers who seek to use
trading data to model societal behaviours should do so carefully. We
can observe that in some specific cases, market data may be a mean-
ingful proxy for national levels of drug consumption. However we
also find that this varies widely by drug type and geography. For
use in models, it is advisable to limit the use of darknet data to well-
specified scenarios, and then make efforts to carefully ground these
measurements. We should further emphasise that the data is sys-
tematically biased in a number of aspects, including the particular
demographic profile of participants [5–7, 35, 36].
7 CONCLUSION
Are darknet markets slowly reorganising the global drug trade? In
a large-scale empirical study, we determined the darknet trading
geography of three plant-based drugs across the largest markets,
and compare it to the global footprint of production and consump-
tion for these drugs. This is the first study to analyse the economic
geography of darknet markets in such a comprehensive empirical
manner, and our findings allow us to draw new inferences about
the nature of the underlying supply chain. We cannot find evidence
for a significant producer presence across any of the drug types or
marketplaces. Instead, we present strong evidence that cannabis
and cocaine vendors are primarily located in a small number of
highly active consumer countries, suggesting that darknet markets
primarily inhabit the role of local retailers serving the ‘last mile’ for
certain regions. This likely leaves old trafficking routes intact. By
comparison, a model to explain trading volumes of opiates is incon-
clusive. Our findings further suggest that the geography of darknet
market trades is primarily driven by existing consumer demand,
rather than new demand fostered by these markets. We propose
that this presents a theoretical contribution that helps characterise
the economic geography of darknet markets with new specificity.
Our study provides new evidence that helps situate these platforms
within the global production networks of the illicit drug trade.
7.1 Future Work
The proposed model is too simple to explain the trading geogra-
phy of opiates, and possibly other drug categories. Further work
is needed to develop models that better characterise the economic
geography of these products. Similarly, there are unresolved ques-
tions about the drivers behind darknet market adoption. What can
explain the geographic focus on a small number of consumer coun-
tries? Additional factors need to be considered that can mediate
such adoption, including internet use, local drug policy and en-
forcement practices, and other socio-economic indicators. Finally,
models of the darknet market global production network should
consider the retail nature of these markets in more detail. There
are suggestions in the literature that these platforms may not be
exclusively focused on selling to end users, but may also be bulk
suppliers to buyers who then become offline distributors [1–3]. Are
darknet markets best considered as retail centres, or as brokers for
regional wholesale suppliers?
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